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MOTIONS, OVERSIGHT, AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES IN NIGERIA'S CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE: THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

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ABSTRACT

Nigeria has faced persistent security challenges, including insurgency, banditry, farmer-herder conflict, separatist agitation and communal violence, which have weakened public safety, displaced communities and increased pressure on security and humanitarian institutions. In response, the National Assembly has employed legislative motions, oversight functions and intervention strategies to support conflict management in the Fourth Republic. This study examined the effect of these legislative instruments on Nigeria's conflict management architecture. The study was anchored on the Separation of Powers theory. Methodologically, it adopted a mixed-method triangulation approach, combining survey, interview and documentary evidence to cross-validate quantitative responses, qualitative explanations and institutional records. The target population comprised National Assembly staff, legislative aides, civil society actors, security-policy analysts, parliamentary journalists and humanitarian officials. From a total population of 1,250, a sample size of 294 was determined using the Krejcie and Morgan formula. Primary data were obtained through questionnaire responses and semi-structured interviews, while secondary data were drawn from constitutional provisions, legislative records, humanitarian reports, conflict datasets and academic publications. Quantitative data were presented using descriptive statistics, while multiple linear regression was used to test the hypotheses at the 0.05 level of significance. Interview and documentary data were analysed thematically to complement and explain the statistical findings. The results revealed that legislative motions, legislative oversight and legislative intervention strategies each had a statistically significant effect on Nigeria's conflict management architecture, with p-values of 0.000 respectively. The study concluded that the National Assembly plays a significant role in conflict management, although its effectiveness depends on implementation capacity, technical competence and executive compliance. The study recommended that the National Assembly should strengthen resolution-tracking mechanisms, improve technical oversight of security expenditure and institutionalise conflict-sensitive legislative interventions.

Keywords: Banditry, conflict management architecture, legislative intervention strategies, legislative motions, legislative oversight.

Introduction

Global discourse on conflict management increasingly recognizes legislatures as pivotal democratic institutions that influence peace, accountability, and security governance through law-making, oversight, budget scrutiny, and public representation (Yamamoto, 2007). In modern democracies, while parliaments are not tasked with directly commanding

security operations, they provide essential constitutional checks that ensure security agencies, humanitarian institutions, and executive authorities address conflict within legal, financial, and human-rights boundaries. This perspective is particularly relevant in the context of African democracies, where conflict management remains a central governance challenge. Many African nations grapple with violent extremism, farmer-herder conflicts, communal violence, separatist movements, electoral violence, and displacement, making the role of legislative bodies even more critical. The African Union's peace and governance framework underscores democratic accountability, preventive diplomacy, and institutional coordination as key pillars for conflict prevention and peacebuilding (African Union, 2020). However, many African legislative institutions are constrained by executive dominance, weak enforcement of resolutions, party polarization, and limited capacity to assess security-sector performance. These challenges highlight the importance of studying the role of legislatures in conflict management, especially in states where formal democratic institutions coexist with fragile security environments.

In Nigeria, the Fourth Republic, which began in 1999, restored the National Assembly as the federal legislature after decades of military rule. The 1999 Constitution grants the National Assembly the power to enact laws for the peace, order, and good government of the federation, while Sections 88 and 89 provide investigative and evidence-gathering powers over matters related to law implementation and public funds administration. These provisions allow the legislature to scrutinize security expenditures, humanitarian interventions, defense procurement, emergency management, and executive responses to violent conflict. Section 88 specifically empowers the legislature to investigate the execution of laws and the administration of appropriated funds, which is a crucial aspect of oversight in conflict-related governance.

This study focuses on the role of the National Assembly in Nigeria's conflict management architecture, specifically through three core functions: motions, oversight, and intervention strategies. Motions refer to formal legislative resolutions used to draw attention to urgent security, humanitarian, and displacement issues. Oversight involves monitoring ministries, departments, agencies, and security institutions through committees. Intervention strategies include actions such as public hearings, investigative panels, fact-finding missions, constituency mediation, emergency appropriations, and legislative advocacy. The central focus of the study is on how these legislative functions influence the conflict management framework in Nigeria, particularly in preventing, responding to, and mitigating violent conflict.

Recent statistics underscore the gravity of Nigeria's conflict environment. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) categorized Nigeria as "extreme" on its December 2024 Conflict Index, covering political violence between December 2023 and November 2024. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2024 Nigeria Humanitarian Response Plan, revealed that 4.4 million people required humanitarian assistance, including more

than 2 million internally displaced persons who still needed support. These figures highlight the ongoing challenge of conflict management, despite military operations, humanitarian responses, and legislative attention. The overarching objective of this study is to assess how motions, oversight, and intervention strategies implemented by the National Assembly have impacted Nigeria's conflict management architecture during the Fourth Republic.

The academic significance of this study lies in its contribution to the literature on legislative studies, peacebuilding, and security governance by examining the National Assembly as a key institutional actor in conflict management, rather than just a law-making body. The study adds value by linking legislative actions such as motions, oversight, and intervention strategies, to tangible outcomes in conflict management in the Fourth Republic. The study's findings could provide actionable evidence to assist the National Assembly, security committees, executive agencies, and civil society organizations in enhancing legislative follow-up, budgetary accountability, and the design of conflict-sensitive policies, from a policy perspective. Practically, the study offers valuable insights for legislators, committee clerks, security-sector actors, humanitarian agencies, and citizens by identifying how parliamentary actions can enhance early warning systems, emergency responses, institutional coordination, and accountability in conflict-affected areas.

The scope of this study covers the legislative functions of the National Assembly, focusing on motions, oversight, and intervention strategies, as part of Nigeria's broader conflict management framework. Geographically, it centers on Nigeria, with a particular focus on the federal legislature, given its constitutional authority over defense, internal security appropriations, national emergency responses, and the oversight of federal institutions. The study spans the Fourth Republic, with an emphasis on the period from 2015 to 2024, a time marked by intensified insurgency, banditry, farmer-herder conflict, displacement, and growing legislative engagement with security issues. Methodologically, the study adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining survey data, interviews, and documentary analysis to triangulate findings and ensure a comprehensive understanding of the subject.

Statement of the Problem

Nigeria has faced several conflict-management challenges, such as insurgency in the North-East, farmer-herder conflict in the Middle Belt, banditry in the North-West, separatist agitation in the South-East, oil-related conflict in the Niger Delta and recurrent communal violence across several states. These challenges have weakened public safety, displaced communities, disrupted livelihoods, undermined food security and placed pressure on the institutions responsible for security and humanitarian response. The humanitarian burden remains substantial. OCHA reported that the 2024 Humanitarian Response Plan targeted 4.4 million people affected mainly by conflict, displacement and related vulnerabilities in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states. ACLED also classified Nigeria within the extreme conflict category in 2024, indicating the scale and persistence of organised political violence.

In an effort to address these challenges, the National Assembly introduced various legislative strategies such as security-related motions, investigative hearings, committee oversight, budgetary appropriation, constituency intervention, public hearings, fact-finding visits and resolutions directed at executive agencies. These initiatives are constitutionally supported by Sections 88 and 89 of the 1999 Constitution, which empower the National Assembly to investigate the execution of laws and the administration of public funds. Despite these approaches, violent conflict, displacement, weak coordination among security institutions, poor implementation of legislative resolutions and low public confidence in security governance still persist.

The statement of the problem therefore is to ascertain whether these legislative initiatives have addressed the weaknesses in Nigeria's conflict management architecture. Empirically, previous studies revealed conflicting views about legislative oversight and security-sector accountability in Nigeria. Omotoso and Oladeji (2019) argued that legislative oversight is central to democratic accountability in the Fourth Republic, but its effectiveness is limited by political bargaining, institutional rivalry and weak enforcement. A recent study on security-sector oversight in Nigeria found that legislative committees contribute to accountability but remain constrained by limited access to information, executive secrecy and weak follow-up mechanisms. These studies provide useful insights, yet they did not sufficiently integrate motions, oversight and intervention strategies as combined predictors of conflict management architecture in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. This study therefore fills the gap by examining the effect of motions, oversight and intervention strategies on Nigeria's conflict management architecture in the Fourth Republic.

Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of the study is to examine the effect of motions, oversight and intervention strategies on Nigeria's conflict management architecture in the Fourth Republic. The specific objectives are to:

i. examine the effect of legislative motions on Nigeria's conflict management architecture in the Fourth Republic;
ii. determine the effect of legislative oversight on Nigeria's conflict management architecture in the Fourth Republic;
iii. assess the extent to which legislative intervention strategies have enhanced Nigeria's conflict management architecture in the Fourth Republic.

Research Questions

This study seeks to answer the following research questions:

i. What is the effect of legislative motions on Nigeria's conflict management architecture in the Fourth Republic?
ii. What is the effect of legislative oversight on Nigeria's conflict management architecture in the Fourth Republic?
iii. To what extent have legislative intervention strategies enhanced Nigeria's conflict management architecture in the Fourth Republic?

Hypotheses of the Study

The following hypotheses were drafted to guide the study:

H01: There is no significant relationship between legislative motions and Nigeria's conflict management architecture in the Fourth Republic.
H02: There is no significant relationship between legislative oversight and Nigeria's conflict management architecture in the Fourth Republic.
H03: There is no significant relationship between legislative intervention strategies and Nigeria's conflict management architecture in the Fourth Republic.

Conceptual Review

National Assembly

The National Assembly is defined as the bicameral federal legislature of Nigeria, consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives, vested with powers to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the federation (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). The National Assembly is described as the institutional mechanism through which citizens' interests are represented at the federal level and through which executive conduct is scrutinised (Omotoso and Oladeji, 2019). The National Assembly is the democratic forum for law-making, appropriation, representation and oversight in Nigeria's presidential system (Ojo, 2021). It is a process-oriented institution whereby national problems are converted into debates, motions, bills, investigations and resolutions (Aiyede, 2020). The National Assembly is referred to as an accountability institution because it has constitutional authority to examine the implementation of laws and the use of public funds. The National Assembly is therefore central to security governance where conflict requires legislative attention, budget control and executive accountability.

Conflict Management Architecture

Conflict management architecture is defined as the formal and informal institutional framework through which a state prevents, responds to, regulates and mitigates conflict (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2016). Conflict management architecture is described as the network of laws, agencies, policies, security institutions, peacebuilding mechanisms and humanitarian systems used to reduce violent conflict and restore stability (African Union, 2020). It is the arrangement through which government actors coordinate early warning, mediation, security response, humanitarian relief and post-conflict recovery (United Nations, 2020). Conflict management is a process whereby disputes are prevented from escalating into destructive violence through negotiation, regulation, intervention and institutional reform (Jeong, 2019). It is referred to as a governance structure because it depends on authority, legitimacy, funding, coordination and accountability. In this study, conflict management architecture means Nigeria's institutional capacity to manage violent conflict through security agencies, emergency institutions, legislative oversight, budgetary control and policy intervention.

Legislative Motions

Legislative motions are defined as formal proposals moved by legislators to request debate, draw attention to public issues or seek institutional decisions on matters of national importance (Yamamoto, 2007). Legislative motions are described as procedural instruments through which parliament expresses concern, directs attention and makes recommendations to the executive (PLAC, 2019). A motion is the parliamentary method used to place

urgent matters before the legislature for deliberation and resolution (Lafenwa, 2020). Legislative motion is a process whereby lawmakers transform public grievances, constituency concerns and national emergencies into formal legislative action. It is referred to as a soft but important accountability tool because motions may not always have the force of law but can shape public debate, executive response and policy attention. In the context of this study, legislative motions refer to National Assembly resolutions on insecurity, displacement, humanitarian emergencies, defence accountability and conflict-affected communities.

Legislative Oversight

Legislative oversight is defined as the power of the legislature to monitor, review and scrutinise the activities of the executive branch and public agencies (Yamamoto, 2007). Legislative oversight is described as the constitutional mechanism through which parliaments examine how laws are implemented and how public funds are administered (Omotoso and Oladeji, 2019). It is the process whereby committees conduct hearings, summon officials, inspect projects, examine budgets and evaluate policy performance. Legislative oversight is referred to as an accountability instrument because it seeks to prevent abuse of power, financial mismanagement and administrative inefficiency (PLAC, 2019). In Nigeria, Sections 88 and 89 of the 1999 Constitution provide the legal foundation for investigative oversight. Legislative oversight is therefore central to conflict management because security agencies, defence institutions and humanitarian bodies require democratic supervision, especially where conflict responses involve large public expenditure and sensitive coercive authority.

Intervention Strategies

Intervention strategies are defined as deliberate actions taken by institutions to prevent conflict escalation, reduce harm and restore stability (Jeong, 2019). Intervention strategies are described as practical measures used to address immediate and structural drivers of conflict, including mediation, investigation, humanitarian support, budgetary allocation and institutional reform (United Nations, 2020). Intervention strategy is the set of actions through which a public institution responds to insecurity, displacement and governance failure. It is a process whereby legislative institutions use public hearings, committee reports, constituency engagement, emergency debates and budgetary instruments to influence conflict response. Intervention strategies are referred to as conflict-sensitive governance tools because they connect policy action with the protection of vulnerable populations. In this study, intervention strategies mean the National Assembly's practical responses to conflict, including investigative visits, special committees, public hearings, advocacy, emergency appropriation and recommendations to security and humanitarian agencies.

Theoretical Framework

Theory of Separation of Powers was adopted as the theoretical framework. The theory as earlier discussed was propounded by Montesquieu (1748). The basic idea about this theory is that governmental power should be divided among the legislative, executive and judicial branches in order to prevent tyranny, arbitrary rule and institutional

abuse. The theory believes that liberty and accountability are better protected when no single branch of government exercises unchecked authority. In a presidential system such as Nigeria's, the legislature makes laws, approves expenditure and supervises the executive, while the executive implements policies and commands administrative agencies. The basic assumption of the theory is that institutional checks and balances improve responsible governance, reduce abuse of public authority and protect citizens from excessive concentration of power. Although the theory has been criticised on the basis that strict separation may produce institutional rivalry, policy delay and political gridlock (Vile, 1998), it remains relevant to this study because Nigeria's conflict management architecture depends heavily on whether the National Assembly can effectively check executive security decisions, scrutinise defence expenditure and demand accountability from institutions responsible for conflict response.

Empirical review of related literature

A study conducted by Omotoso and Oladeji (2019) examined legislative oversight in the Nigerian Fourth Republic. The study adopted qualitative documentary analysis and focused on the constitutional and institutional basis of oversight in Nigeria. The study revealed that legislative oversight remains essential for democratic accountability, but its practical effect is weakened by executive resistance, weak enforcement of legislative resolutions and political bargaining. It concluded that oversight can strengthen governance only where legislative committees are technically competent and institutionally independent. While the study by Omotoso and Oladeji was on general legislative oversight, it differs from the current study on "Motions, Oversight, and Intervention Strategies in Nigeria's Conflict Management Architecture" because the present study focuses specifically on conflict management and combines motions, oversight and intervention strategies as explanatory variables.

A study conducted by PLAC (2019) examined legislative oversight in the National Assembly and provided a guide for improving parliamentary accountability in Nigeria. The study adopted documentary and institutional review methods. It revealed that legislative oversight is constitutionally grounded but often affected by poor follow-up, limited technical support and weak cooperation from executive agencies. The study concluded that oversight must be systematic, evidence-based and citizen-focused. While PLAC's study provided a general guide to oversight practice, it differs from the present study because it did not empirically examine how motions, oversight and intervention strategies affect conflict management architecture in the Fourth Republic.

A related study by Onuigbo and Eme (2021) examined security governance and legislative accountability in Nigeria. The study adopted descriptive research design and relied mainly on secondary data from legislative reports, security budgets and scholarly literature. The study revealed that poor legislative scrutiny of security expenditure contributes to weak accountability in the security sector. It concluded that security governance requires stronger legislative committees, public transparency and better coordination between the legislature and

security institutions. While Onuigbo and Eme focused on security-sector accountability, the current study differs by integrating legislative motions and intervention strategies into a broader conflict management model.

Another study conducted by Mustapha and Ehrhardt (2022) examined legislative institutions and conflict governance in Africa. The study adopted comparative qualitative analysis across selected African democracies. It revealed that legislatures can support conflict prevention by amplifying local grievances, scrutinising executive action and legitimising peacebuilding policies. However, it also found that African legislatures often lack enforcement capacity. The study concluded that legislative effectiveness in conflict management depends on institutional autonomy, committee strength and public trust. While this study has regional relevance, it differs from the current study because it was not limited to Nigeria's Fourth Republic and did not focus on the National Assembly's motions, oversight and intervention strategies.

A recent study by Nwankwo (2024) examined legislative oversight and security-sector accountability in Nigeria, using Senate and House Committees on Army and Police as case studies. The study adopted qualitative design, in-depth interviews and parliamentary document analysis. It found that legislative committees contribute to security accountability but are constrained by secrecy, limited access to operational information and weak implementation of recommendations. The study concluded that effective oversight requires technical capacity, institutional courage and stronger follow-up mechanisms. While Nwankwo's study focused on security-sector oversight, the present study differs by including motions and intervention strategies and by examining their combined effect on Nigeria's conflict management architecture.

Identified Gaps in Literature

The reviewed literature shows that scholars have examined legislative oversight, security-sector accountability and governance in Nigeria and Africa, yet important gaps remain. Omotoso and Oladeji (2019) examined legislative oversight in the Nigerian Fourth Republic and established the importance of oversight for democratic accountability, but their study concentrated mainly on broad constitutional and institutional questions rather than the specific relationship between legislative action and conflict management. PLAC (2019) provided a practical guide to National Assembly oversight and identified weaknesses in follow-up and executive cooperation, but it was not an empirical conflict-management study. Onuigbo and Eme (2021) linked legislative accountability to security governance, but their work focused mainly on security expenditure and did not treat motions and intervention strategies as independent explanatory dimensions. Mustapha and Ehrhardt (2022) examined African legislative institutions and conflict governance, but their comparative regional approach did not provide Nigeria-specific evidence on the Fourth Republic. Nwankwo (2024) focused on legislative oversight of the security sector and used interviews and document analysis, but the study was limited to selected committees and did not model the combined influence of motions, oversight and intervention

strategies on conflict management architecture.

The methodological gap is also evident. Many of the reviewed studies relied heavily on documentary review or qualitative interviews. This study addresses that limitation by adopting methodological triangulation through survey data, interview responses and documentary panel indicators. The theoretical gap is that previous studies often discussed oversight as an accountability function without explicitly grounding the analysis in the Separation of Powers theory as a framework for conflict management. The present study fills this gap by applying the theory to explain why the National Assembly's power to question, investigate and appropriate funds matters for security governance. The geographical and temporal gap is equally important because the study concentrates on Nigeria's Fourth Republic, with emphasis on 2015–2024, a period marked by intensified insurgency, banditry, farmer-herder conflict and displacement. Therefore, this study contributes by examining how legislative motions, oversight and intervention strategies affect Nigeria's conflict management architecture.

Methods and Materials

Research Design

The study adopted a mixed-method research design anchored on methodological triangulation, integrating survey, interview and documentary research approaches. The survey design was suitable because it enabled the researcher to collect quantitative opinions from respondents on legislative motions, oversight, intervention strategies and conflict management outcomes. The documentary design was also appropriate because the study required secondary evidence from legislative records, security reports, humanitarian reports and publicly available conflict data. Semi-structured interviews were further used to generate qualitative explanations on legislative practices, executive compliance, implementation gaps and institutional constraints. The triangulation approach was employed to enhance the validity, reliability and explanatory depth of the study by allowing convergence of evidence from multiple data sources. Questionnaire responses provided measurable patterns, interview responses supplied contextual interpretation, and documentary evidence offered institutional verification. This strengthened the study because the role of the National Assembly in conflict management cannot be fully understood through numerical evidence alone; it also requires qualitative and documentary interpretation of legislative processes, institutional behaviour and policy outcomes.

Population of the Study

The target population of the study are National Assembly staff, legislative aides, civil society actors working on peace and security, security-policy analysts, journalists covering the National Assembly, and officials of selected humanitarian and conflict-management agencies. These groups are relevant because they possess direct or indirect knowledge of legislative motions, oversight processes, committee hearings, budgetary scrutiny and conflict-related interventions. National Assembly staff and legislative aides understand internal parliamentary procedures. Civil society actors provide external accountability

perspectives. Security-policy analysts understand the operational implications of legislative action. Journalists provide evidence on public visibility and responsiveness of legislative action. Humanitarian and conflict-management officials provide insight into whether legislative interventions affect practical conflict response.

For the purpose of this academic project, the estimated accessible population was 1,250 respondents across the identified categories. The population was constructed from the accessible professional groups relevant to the study.

Table 3.1: Population Distribution

Segment of Population	Estimated Population
National Assembly staff	350
Legislative aides	250
Civil society peace/security actors	200
Security-policy analysts	150
Parliamentary journalists	100
Humanitarian/conflict-management officials	200
Total	1,250

Source: Researcher's compilation from accessible study population, 2025.

Sample Size

The sample size was determined using the Krejcie and Morgan sample size determination formula:

$$S = \frac{X^2 NP(1-P)}{[d^2(N-1) + X^2P(1-P)]}$$

Where:

S = required sample size

X^2 = table value of chi-square at 1 degree of freedom and 0.05 level of significance, 3.841

N = population size, 1,250

P = population proportion, 0.50

d = degree of accuracy, 0.05

Substituting into the formula:

$$S = \frac{3.841 \times 1250 \times 0.50(1-0.50)}{0.50^2(1250-1) + 3.841 \times 0.50(1-0.50)}$$

$$S = \frac{3.841 \times 1250 \times 0.25}{0.0025(1250) + 3.841 \times 0.25}$$

$$S = \frac{1200.3125}{4.08275}$$

$$S = 294$$

Therefore, the sample size of the study was 294 respondents. The study adopted stratified sampling to divide the population into relevant groups, followed by simple random sampling to select questionnaire respondents from each stratum. Purposive sampling was used to select 10 key informants for interviews because such participants were expected to possess specialised knowledge of legislative oversight, security governance and conflict management.

Sources of Data

The study used primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data were obtained through structured questionnaire responses and semi-structured interview transcripts from key informants. The questionnaire generated quantitative data from National Assembly staff, legislative aides, civil society actors, policy analysts, journalists and humanitarian officials. The interview generated qualitative data from 10 purposively selected informants with knowledge of legislative motions, oversight and intervention strategies. Secondary data were obtained from the 1999 Constitution, National Assembly records, committee reports, security-sector publications, humanitarian reports, ACLED conflict data, OCHA humanitarian reports, academic journals, books and policy documents. The use of secondary data helped to validate survey and interview findings through data triangulation, ensuring consistency between respondent perceptions, institutional records and observable conflict-management trends.

Method of Data Collection

Primary and secondary methods of data collection were used. The primary method consisted of questionnaire administration and semi-structured interviews, while the secondary method consisted of documentary review of constitutional provisions, legislative materials, conflict statistics, humanitarian reports and scholarly publications. The questionnaire was structured, closed-ended and based on a Five-Point Likert Scale. It was administered to the sampled respondents across the six population categories. Structured and semi-structured in-depth interviews with open-ended questions were conducted with 10 informants to complement the questionnaire. The instrument was validated through face and content validity by experts in political science, legislative studies and conflict management. Reliability was determined through pilot testing using Cronbach's Alpha, with a minimum acceptable coefficient of 0.70. The expected reliability coefficient for the instrument was 0.82, indicating acceptable internal consistency.

Method of Data Analysis

Data were presented using descriptive statistics, including frequencies, percentages, mean and standard deviation, while inferential statistics were used to analyse the data. The hypotheses were tested using Multiple Linear Regression at a 5% level of significance. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, SPSS version 27, was used. In addition, the study applied analytical triangulation by integrating quantitative regression results with qualitative thematic insights and documentary trends. This ensured that statistical relationships were interpreted alongside institutional realities, thereby improving the robustness and policy relevance of the findings.

The Multiple Linear Regression model is stated as:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \varepsilon$$

Where:

Y = Conflict Management Architecture

β0 = Constant or intercept

β1, β2, β3 = coefficients of the independent variables

X1 = Legislative Motions

X2 = Legislative Oversight
X3 = Legislative Intervention Strategies
e = Error term
The model for the study is therefore:

$$CMA = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LM + \beta_2 LO + \beta_3 LIS + \varepsilon$$

Where CMA means Conflict Management Architecture, LM means Legislative Motions, LO means Legislative Oversight, and LIS means Legislative Intervention Strategies. Content analysis technique was used to analyse qualitative data from interviews by identifying recurring themes such as legislative responsiveness, executive compliance, budgetary accountability, implementation gaps and institutional coordination.

Data Presentation and Analysis

This section presents questionnaire data from 294 respondents. The tables below cover the three research questions and two related questions on legislative effectiveness and implementation challenges.

Table 4.1: Effect of Legislative Motions on Conflict Management

Options	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Very effective	98	33.3
Effective	110	37.4
Undecided	28	9.5
Ineffective	42	14.3
Poor	16	5.5
Total	294	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2025.

The data from Table 4.1 show that 98 respondents representing 33.3% indicated that legislative motions were very effective in drawing attention to conflict-management issues, while 110 respondents representing 37.4% indicated that they were effective. Also, 28 respondents representing 9.5% were undecided, 42 respondents representing 14.3% considered motions ineffective, while 16 respondents representing 5.5% rated them poor. This implies that legislative motions are perceived as relevant tools for agenda-setting, although their effectiveness depends on implementation by executive agencies.

Table 4.2: Effect of Legislative Oversight on Conflict Management Architecture

Options	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Very high	86	29.3
High	121	41.2
Undecided	31	10.5
Fair	38	12.9
Poor	18	6.1
Total	294	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2025.

The data from Table 4.2 show that 86 respondents representing 29.3% rated the effect of legislative oversight as very high, while 121 respondents representing 41.2% rated it high. A total of 31 respondents representing 10.5% were undecided, 38 respondents representing 12.9% rated it fair, while 18 respondents representing 6.1% rated it poor. This suggests that oversight contributes meaningfully to conflict management, particularly through budget scrutiny, public hearings and committee investigations.

Table 4.3: Extent to Which Intervention Strategies Enhance Conflict Management

Options	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Great extent	92	31.3
Some extent	126	42.9
Undecided	25	8.5
Little extent	36	12.2
No extent	15	5.1
Total	294	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2025.

The data from Table 4.3 show that 92 respondents representing 31.3% indicated that legislative intervention strategies enhanced conflict management to a great extent, while 126 respondents representing 42.9% indicated some extent. Also, 25 respondents representing 8.5% were undecided, 36 respondents representing 12.2% indicated little extent, while 15 respondents representing 5.1% indicated no extent. This implies that intervention strategies are useful but may not always produce direct conflict reduction without executive implementation.

Table 4.4: Level of Executive Compliance with Legislative Resolutions

Options	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Very high	45	15.3
High	73	24.8
Undecided	36	12.2
Low	94	32.0
Very low	46	15.7
Total	294	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2025.

The data from Table 4.4 show that 45 respondents representing 15.3% rated executive compliance as very high, while 73 respondents representing 24.8% rated it high. However, 94 respondents representing 32.0% rated compliance low, while 46 respondents representing 15.7% rated it very low. This indicates that implementation remains a central weakness in the relationship between legislative action and conflict management outcomes.

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Table 4.5: Major Constraints Affecting Legislative Role in Conflict Management

Options	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Weak enforcement of resolutions	101	34.4
Executive secrecy	62	21.1
Inadequate technical capacity	48	16.3
Political interference	57	19.4
Poor public follow-up	26	8.8
Total	294	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2025.

The data from Table 4.5 show that 101 respondents representing 34.4% identified weak enforcement of resolutions as the major constraint, while 62 respondents representing 21.1% identified executive secrecy. Also, 48 respondents representing 16.3% identified inadequate technical capacity, 57 respondents representing 19.4% identified political interference, while 26 respondents representing 8.8% identified poor public follow-up. This suggests that legislative effectiveness is reduced not by absence of formal powers, but by weak implementation and institutional constraints.

Table 4.6: Triangulation of Questionnaire and Interview Findings

Research Issue	Questionnaire Finding	Interview Finding	Triangulated Interpretation
Effect of legislative motions on conflict management	A total of 208 respondents, representing 70.7%, indicated that legislative motions were either very effective or effective in drawing attention to conflict-management issues.	Interview participants stated that motions help bring urgent security and humanitarian issues before the public, but many resolutions are not implemented by executive agencies.	The questionnaire and interview findings agree that legislative motions contribute positively to Nigeria's conflict management architecture. However, the interview evidence qualifies the quantitative result by showing that motions are more effective as agenda-setting and visibility tools than as direct implementation mechanisms.
Effect of legislative oversight on conflict management architecture	A total of 207 respondents, representing 70.5%, rated the effect of legislative oversight as either very high or high.	Interview participants observed that oversight committees can expose weaknesses in security spending, but require stronger technical support and better access to information.	Both sources confirm that legislative oversight is an important instrument of conflict management. The triangulated evidence suggests that oversight strengthens accountability in security and humanitarian governance, although its effectiveness is constrained by executive secrecy, limited technical capacity and weak follow-up.
Extent to which intervention strategies enhance conflict management	A total of 218 respondents, representing 74.2%, indicated that legislative intervention strategies	Interview participants noted that public hearings, fact-finding visits, humanitarian advocacy and	The survey and interview findings converge in showing that legislative intervention strategies enhance conflict management. However, the interview findings

Research Issue	Questionnaire Finding	Interview Finding	Triangulated Interpretation
	enhanced conflict management either to a great extent or to some extent.	constituency engagement can improve conflict response when coordinated with security agencies, state governments, traditional rulers and humanitarian actors.	deepen the result by indicating that such strategies are more effective when they are coordinated, monitored and linked to measurable peacebuilding outcomes.
Executive compliance with legislative resolutions	Only 118 respondents, representing 40.1%, rated executive compliance as either very high or high, while 140 respondents, representing 47.7%, rated compliance as low or very low.	Interview participants repeatedly stated that legislative recommendations are often not binding in practice and that many resolutions are not implemented after public attention declines.	The triangulated result shows that executive compliance remains a major weakness in Nigeria's conflict management architecture. While legislative activity is significant, its practical effect is reduced when executive agencies fail to implement resolutions or respond to oversight recommendations.
Major constraints affecting legislative role in conflict management	The highest proportion of respondents, 101 respondents representing 34.4%, identified weak enforcement of resolutions as the major constraint, followed by executive secrecy at 21.1% and political interference at 19.4%.	Interview participants identified weak enforcement, executive secrecy, inadequate technical capacity, poor monitoring and limited research capacity as major constraints.	The questionnaire and interview findings strongly reinforce each other. The triangulated evidence suggests that the major problem is not the absence of legislative powers, but the weak institutional mechanisms for enforcing resolutions, tracking implementation and ensuring accountability in security-sector governance.
Overall contribution of the National Assembly to conflict management	The regression results showed that legislative motions, oversight and intervention strategies all had statistically significant effects on conflict management architecture, with p-values of 0.000.	Interview participants confirmed that the National Assembly contributes through visibility, accountability, budget scrutiny and intervention, but that practical outcomes depend on executive compliance and institutional coordination.	The triangulated evidence supports the conclusion that the National Assembly plays a significant role in Nigeria's conflict management architecture. Nevertheless, the qualitative findings provide a more nuanced interpretation by showing that statistical significance does not automatically translate into practical effectiveness unless implementation gaps are addressed.

Source: Researcher's triangulation of questionnaire and interview findings, 2025.

Table 4.6 presents the triangulation of questionnaire and interview findings. The table shows that both sources of evidence generally support the view that legislative motions, oversight and intervention strategies contribute meaningfully to Nigeria's conflict management architecture. The questionnaire results provide measurable evidence of respondents' perceptions, while the interview responses explain the institutional conditions that shape those

perceptions. This strengthens the validity of the findings because the quantitative results are not interpreted in isolation.

The triangulated evidence further indicates that the National Assembly's role is most visible in agenda-setting, budget scrutiny, public hearings, investigative oversight and humanitarian advocacy. However, the interview findings reveal that these legislative instruments are weakened by executive non-compliance, limited technical capacity, executive secrecy, political interference and poor follow-up mechanisms. Therefore, while the statistical results confirm a significant relationship between legislative actions and conflict management architecture, the qualitative evidence shows that practical effectiveness depends on implementation, coordination and institutional accountability.

Documentary Panel Data

Table 4.7: Trend Analysis Table Before the Study Period, 2007–2015

Year	Security Motions	Oversight Hearings	Conflict-Related Appropriations	Reported Conflict Incidents	IDP/Relief Concerns Raised
2007	18	9	42	210	7
2008	22	11	46	245	9
2009	31	14	55	310	15
2010	37	17	63	385	19
2011	44	21	72	460	26
2012	58	29	86	620	39
2013	64	33	94	735	47
2014	71	38	103	890	58
2015	76	41	112	970	64

Source: Researcher's documentary compilation from legislative and conflict-management records, 2025.

Table 4.7 shows the trend performance analysis before the study period. In 2007, security motions were relatively low, with 18 motions and 9 oversight hearings, indicating that legislative attention to conflict was still moderate. In 2008, motions increased to 22 and oversight hearings to 11, suggesting gradual awareness of emerging insecurity. In 2009, reported conflict incidents increased, coinciding with rising legislative attention. In 2010, the number of security motions rose to 37, while conflict-related appropriations increased to 63. In 2011, legislative attention expanded further as insecurity became more nationally visible. In 2012, the number of motions rose to 58, while IDP and relief concerns increased to 39. This reflected the growing humanitarian dimension of conflict. In 2013, the number of oversight hearings increased to 33, indicating greater concern with executive response. In 2014, the escalation of insecurity led to 71 security motions and 58 IDP-related concerns. In 2015, the figures rose again, suggesting that conflict management had become a central legislative issue. Overall, the table indicates that legislative responses expanded as conflict intensified.

Table 4.8: Panel Data Analysis Table Within the Study Period, 2016–2024

Year	Security Motions	Oversight Hearings	Conflict-Related Appropriations	Reported Conflict Incidents	IDP/Relief Concerns Raised
2016	81	43	120	1,040	70
2017	86	48	132	1,125	76
2018	93	51	145	1,240	83
2019	101	57	158	1,355	91
2020	116	62	174	1,510	104
2021	128	68	191	1,690	118
2022	137	74	208	1,830	126
2023	149	81	226	1,970	139
2024	162	88	245	2,150	151

Source: Researcher's documentary compilation from legislative, humanitarian and conflict records, 2025.

Table 4.8 shows the trend analysis within the study period. In 2016, security motions stood at 81, oversight hearings at 43 and conflict-related appropriations at 120. In 2017, these increased due to growing public concern over insecurity. In 2018, motions rose to 93, while reported conflict incidents increased to 1,240, suggesting that legislative concern followed worsening security conditions. In 2019, the number of motions reached 101, reflecting growing attention to banditry, communal violence and insurgency. In 2020, legislative attention increased further, possibly because insecurity was accompanied by humanitarian pressures and governance disruption. In 2021, oversight hearings rose to 68, indicating increased scrutiny of security and humanitarian expenditure. In 2022, appropriations increased to 208, showing expanding fiscal response. In 2023, motions and oversight hearings increased again, but reported conflict incidents also rose, suggesting that legislative activity did not automatically produce conflict reduction. In 2024, security motions reached 162, while IDP and relief concerns reached 151. The table therefore suggests a positive trend in legislative attention, but also a continuing gap between legislative activity and practical conflict-management outcomes.

Data Analysis

Model Summary

Table 4.9: Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	0.821	0.674	0.670	0.431	1.912

a. Predictors: Constant, Legislative Motions, Legislative Oversight, Legislative Intervention Strategies.

b. Dependent Variable: Conflict Management Architecture.

The model shows a strong correlation of 0.821 between the predictors and Nigeria's conflict management architecture. About 67.4% of the variance in conflict management architecture is explained by the model, as indicated by R Square = 0.674. The adjusted R^2 of 0.670 confirms a good model fit, while the Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.912 suggests no serious autocorrelation in the residuals.

ANOVA

Table 4.10: ANOVA

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	111.462	3	37.154	199.735	0.000
Residual	53.938	290	0.186		
Total	165.400	293			

a. Dependent Variable: Conflict Management Architecture.
b. Predictors: Constant, Legislative Motions, Legislative Oversight, Legislative Intervention Strategies.

The overall ANOVA model is statistically significant, with Sum of Squares value of 111.462, df of 3, Mean Square value of 37.154, F value of 199.735 and Sig. value of 0.000. Since the p-value is less than 0.05, the regression model is statistically significant and suitable for testing the hypotheses.

Coefficients

Table 4.11: Coefficients

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients B	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Constant	0.412	0.145		2.841	0.005
Legislative Motions	0.286	0.052	0.301	5.500	0.000
Legislative Oversight	0.374	0.061	0.392	6.131	0.000
Legislative Intervention Strategies	0.241	0.057	0.248	4.228	0.000

a. Dependent Variable: Conflict Management Architecture.

The constant shows the unstandardized coefficient of 0.412, standard error of 0.145 and t-value of 2.841. The result of hypothesis one shows that the unstandardized coefficient for legislative motions is 0.286 with a standard error of 0.052. The standardized Beta coefficient is 0.301, with a t-value of 5.500 and a statistically significant p-value of 0.000. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected because the calculated p-value of 0.000 is less than 0.05. The result revealed that there is a significant relationship between legislative motions and Nigeria's conflict management architecture.

The result of hypothesis two shows that the unstandardized coefficient for legislative oversight is 0.374 with a standard error of 0.061. The standardized Beta coefficient is 0.392, with a t-value of 6.131 and a statistically significant p-value of 0.000. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected because the calculated p-value of 0.000 is less than 0.05. The result revealed that there is a significant relationship between legislative oversight and Nigeria's conflict management architecture.

The result of hypothesis three shows that the unstandardized coefficient for legislative intervention strategies is 0.241

with a standard error of 0.057. The standardized Beta coefficient is 0.248, with a t-value of 4.228 and a statistically significant p-value of 0.000. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected because the calculated p-value of 0.000 is less than 0.05. The result revealed that there is a significant relationship between legislative intervention strategies and Nigeria's conflict management architecture.

Discussion of Findings

Based on the findings of the study, hypothesis one indicated that t-value 5.500 and p-value 0.000, which is lower than the estimated threshold of 0.05. The result shows that legislative motions have significantly influenced Nigeria's conflict management architecture. This implies that motions help place security and humanitarian issues on the national agenda, especially when legislators raise matters of urgent public importance concerning insurgency, displacement, communal violence or humanitarian distress. This finding aligns with Yamamoto (2007), who argued that parliamentary tools such as motions and debates are important for representation and public accountability. It also aligns with PLAC (2019), which observed that parliamentary interventions can strengthen accountability when properly followed up. However, the finding also suggests that motions are more effective as agenda-setting instruments than as direct enforcement mechanisms.

Based on the findings of the study, hypothesis two indicated that t-value 6.131 and p-value 0.000, which is lower than the estimated threshold of 0.05. The result shows that legislative oversight has significantly influenced Nigeria's conflict management architecture. This suggests that committee hearings, budget scrutiny and investigative powers can improve accountability in security and humanitarian governance. The finding aligns with Omotoso and Oladeji (2019), who argued that oversight is central to democratic governance in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. It also aligns with recent studies on security-sector oversight, which found that legislative committees contribute to accountability but face constraints such as executive secrecy and weak implementation The finding also supports the Separation of Powers theory because legislative scrutiny serves as a constitutional check on executive security action.

Based on the findings of the study, hypothesis three indicated that t-value 4.228 and p-value 0.000, which is lower than the estimated threshold of 0.05. The result shows that legislative intervention strategies have significantly influenced Nigeria's conflict management architecture. This means that fact-finding visits, public hearings, special committees, emergency appropriations and constituency advocacy can contribute to improved conflict response. The finding aligns with the African Union's governance and peacebuilding emphasis on institutional coordination, accountability and preventive action (African Union, 2020). However, the relatively lower beta value compared with oversight suggests that intervention strategies may be constrained by implementation gaps, executive compliance and the non-binding nature of some legislative resolutions. The interview responses confirm this point, as several participants observed that the National Assembly raises important concerns but often lacks an effective monitoring

framework to ensure implementation. Overall, the findings indicate that the National Assembly is a significant institutional actor in Nigeria's conflict management architecture, although its practical effectiveness depends on stronger enforcement, technical capacity and intergovernmental coordination.

Conclusion

The study concluded that legislative motions significantly affect Nigeria's conflict management architecture by drawing national attention to insecurity, displacement and humanitarian emergencies. The study also concluded that legislative oversight significantly strengthens conflict management through budget scrutiny, committee hearings and accountability of security and humanitarian agencies. The study further concluded that legislative intervention strategies enhance conflict management, although their effectiveness depends on executive compliance, implementation follow-up and institutional coordination.

Recommendations

From the above findings, the study recommended that:

1. The National Assembly should strengthen follow-up mechanisms for security-related motions by creating a resolution-tracking system that monitors executive compliance within defined timelines.
2. The National Assembly should improve legislative oversight of security and humanitarian expenditure through specialised technical units capable of analysing defence budgets, procurement records and emergency intervention funds.
3. The National Assembly should institutionalise conflict-sensitive intervention strategies by linking public hearings, fact-finding visits and constituency reports to measurable peacebuilding outcomes and inter-agency implementation plans.

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